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Losing Dignity: Eroding Privacy Rights of Immigrants in Technology-based
Immigration Enforcement
By: Inma Sumaita
Introduction:
Immigrants and their families across the United States live in constant fear of U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents, who target millions of undocumented persons, raiding their
homes, worksites, and community spaces.1 During an immigration raid, agents physically invade a
workplace, arriving unannounced with militaristic force, to target workers for arrest and deportation.2
Immigration agents seal off the workplace’s exits and detain workers, then send them to remote detention
centers without warning or chance of preparation.3 These worksite raids have resulted in more than 1,800
arrests since 2017.4
In October of 2021, the Biden administration directed enforcement agencies to stop all workplace
raids and instead focus on employers who willfully hire undocumented workers.5 In the past few years,
during which raids have intensified, ICE has rounded up tens of thousands of persons, charged hundreds
with immigration law violations, and deported a massive portion of them.6 Since these raids seek to enforce
U.S. immigration laws against persons who broke the law by entering the U.S. without authorization or by
overstaying their authorization, the morality and legality of these raids are not often questioned. However,
in this ongoing hardline enforcement policy of immigration laws coupled with exponential leaps made in
technology used for such purposes, the amount of basic dignity afford to immigrants are reaching an all
time low.

1

Worksite immigration raids, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER (2020),
https://www.nilc.org/issues/workersrights/worksite-raids/ (last visited Mar 14, 2022).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Jasmine Aguilera, Biden's ice raids shift is too late for immigrant families, TIME (Oct. 20, 2021),
https://time.com/6107024/joe-biden-ice-raids-immigrant-families/ (last visited Mar 14, 2022).
6
Ice statistics, ICE, https://www.ice.gov/remove/statistics (last visited Mar 14, 2022).
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Undocumented immigrants, especially, consistently face risks of discrimination, surveillance, and
deportation. As it becomes easier to track and maintain records of people’s lives through technology and
innovation, the disparity in privacy rights seems to be further perpetuated. This article will explore how the
law's designation of immigrants’ illegality interplays with the Fourth Amendment doctrines of consent,
administrative searches, reasonable expectation of privacy, and pretextual stops to exclude privacy
protection for immigrants. In addition, this article also examines the legal quandries of using technology to
invade privacy through the spread of immigration databases and the proliferation of federal and local
surveillance of spaces occupied by immigrants within the border.
Scope:
This paper looks at the tension between immigration enforcement policies and the basic privacy
rights as afforded by the U.S. Constitution. This paper examines the complex and opaque web of databases,
related systems, and information-sharing mechanisms that facilitate federal immigration and local criminal
enforcement. This paper will further discuss the constitutional issues raised by these immigration
enforcement policies. The databases, systems, and mechanisms in place depend on the participation of
private companies as well as the cooperation of state and local law enforcement with federal law
enforcement and immigration and agencies. This paper will also evaluate the participation of both
government and private actors in the increased surveillance of immigrants.

Background:
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified in 1791 and is intended to
protect the privacy of individuals in the United States. It states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol6/iss2/3
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probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend.IV.
In Katz,7 Justice Harlan famously stated that the Fourth Amendment protects one's reasonable
expectation of privacy.8 Although most Americans enjoy these rights and protections, not everyone in
America does. A population exists within the borders of the United States that is not afforded the right of
privacy or to be left alone, stripped of the basic privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment. Since
undocumented immigrants have limited Constitutional and privacy rights, their personal data is subject to
a high probability of use and abuse. The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and ICE are using
facial recognition software to identify, target, and locate undocumented immigrants. Although this is
seemingly in violation of the rights to due process and to be free from unreasonable searches, and often
uses race as a primary means of discrimination, these rights are not enforced or protected by the courts.
In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment applied to immigration
enforcement, although with an increased tolerance for racial profiling.9 In United States v. BrignoniPonce,10 the Court recognized that traffic-checking practices at the border involve a different balance of
public and private interests, and thus are subject to less stringent constitutional safeguards. Determination
was required as to the circumstances in which a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area of the
border for an inquiry into their residence status. The Court found that such an interference with Fourth
Amendment interests involved in the stop was “modest,”11 while the inquiry served significant law
enforcement needs. The Court therefore held that a roving-patrol stop did not require probable cause and
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is “aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967)
Id at 361.
9
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
884 (1975).
10
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra note 9.
11
Id. at 880.
7
8
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inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that a vehicle contains undocumented
immigrants.12
Through a subsequent series of decisions, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (the
“Fourth Amendment”) has become abraded, granting little to no privacy protections to noncitizens,
particularly in the realm of immigration enforcement.

De-evolution of the Fourth Amendment’s Applicability for Immigrants:
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza,13 completely changed how the Fourth
Amendment was applied to deportation hearings. The Ninth Circuit found that agents of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), the precursor agency to ICE, violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of Adan Lopez-Mendoza and another similarly situated plaintiff, Elias SandovalSanchez, at the time of their immigration arrests. The court found that any evidence that the agents had
acquired through those unconstitutional arrests must therefore be excluded from proceedings in accordance
with the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment.14 The exclusionary rule prevents the use of most
evidence gained in violation of any part of the United States Constitution. A decision called Mapp v. Ohio15
established that the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained from an unreasonable search or seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a plurality opinion written by Justice
O’Connor, the Court held that the exclusionary rule “need not apply” in deportation hearings because
deportation hearings are purely civil in nature and are not criminal hearings.16 Justice O’ Connor
emphasized that “[t]he ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is

Id., at 884.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984)
14
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961)
15
Id.
16
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. at 1034.
12
13
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never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search,
or interrogation occurred.”17
Justice O’ Connor arrived at her holding in trying to balance the Fourth Amendment’s deterrent
effect on future law enforcement misconduct against the loss of probative evidence as discussed in a prior
case, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976). Ultimately, the Court found that the
exclusionary rule is not needed to deter future misconduct because there are other safeguards in place .18
In these circumstances we are persuaded that the Janis balance between costs and benefits
comes out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings held by the
INS. By all appearances the INS has already taken sensible and reasonable steps to deter
Fourth Amendment violations by its officers, and this makes the likely additional deterrent
value of the exclusionary rule small. The costs of applying the exclusionary rule in the
context of civil deportation hearings are high. In particular, application of the exclusionary
rule in cases such as Sandoval-Sanchez’, would compel the courts to release from custody
persons who would then immediately resume their commission of a crime through their
continuing, unlawful presence in this country. “There comes a point at which courts,
consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law
enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive
and Legislative Branches.”That point has been reached here.19
However, in light of recent raids, immigrants are increasingly looked at through the lens of
criminality, and undocumented immigrants are being investigated and tried as criminals.20 Still there has
been slow progress in regard to safeguards needed to ensure the Fourth Amendment rights of immigrants.
The Fourth Amendment became somewhat more pliable in criminal cases involving immigrants in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,21 where the United States Supreme Court reversed the order granting
defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of their residence in Mexico. The defendant
argued that a search of his residence in Mexico violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment against

17

Id.
Id.
19
Id., at 1050 (internal citations deleted).
20
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed in 1986 and made it illegal for employers to
knowingly employ undocumented immigrants. This was the first time that a US law to made the undocumented
status of an individual a designated crime.
21
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1990)
18
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unreasonable search and seizure. The district court held that drug enforcement agents failed to justify the
search of respondent’s Mexico residence without a warrant. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion that
found that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extended its reach
only to “a class of persons who were part of a national community or who had otherwise developed
sufficient connection with the United States to be considered a part of its community.”22 The Court
distinguished the matter from cases where U.S. residents stationed abroad were still afforded rights under
the Constitution, but because the defendant was a Mexican citizen with no voluntary attachment to the
United States, and because the residence which was searched was located in Mexico, the protections against
unreasonable search and seizure did not apply.
Given the vague language of the Verdugo opinion, one interpretation of Verdugo rejects a case-bycase evaluation of individuals' connections to the United States in favor of a categorical exclusion of certain
classes of undocumented immigrants from Fourth Amendment protection. There is no clear consensus on
which classes of undocumented immigrants are outside the Fourth Amendment's scope. The District of
Utah's opinion in United States v. Esparza-Mendoza23 provided that as a previously deported felon, the
defendant in the case, lacked “sufficient connection” to the country to assert a Fourth Amendment
suppression claim.
To determine whether Esparza had “substantial connections” to the United States, the court started
the discussion with, “first, the historical background regarding the attachment of alien felons to the political
community, and, second, the specific facts surrounding (the defendant).”24 With respect to the history of
immigrants with felony charges, the court noted that the Framers “would have had grave concerns about
criminal aliens in particular,”25 and brought attention to Britain's practice of sending convicted felons to its

Id. at 265
United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003), aff'd, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004)
24
Id. at 1267.
25
Id.
22
23
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colonies as indentured servants. The court further noted that even after Britain could no longer send felons
to the U.S., many of the states passed legislation to prohibit the transportation of convicts across their state
borders. According to the court, this historical exclusion of foreign criminals, in combination with the
exclusion of foreigners from voting, weighed against a finding that a foreign felon could be “part of or
connected to the nation's political community. To the contrary, the historical materials suggest that the
Framers were doing everything possible to exclude such persons from the national community.”26
Databases and Immigration Enforcement:
In Gonzalez v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 975 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2020) the detainee
was a United States citizen who was held in county jail on immigration detainer after he was arrested on
state charges. He brought a class action on behalf of current and former immigration detainees challenging
the legality of the practice by the sheriff’s department of detaining individuals solely on the basis of
immigration detainers placed by ICE. The plaintiffs challenged the Government's issuance of immigration
detainers which were based solely on searches of electronic databases to make probable cause
determinations of removability. The district court concluded that the databases were unreliable for
determining probable cause of removability and found that the government thus violated the Fourth
Amendment by issuing detainers based solely on searches of the databases.27
The court of appeals affirmed that to issue a valid immigration detainer, probable cause must be
established to believe that the person being detained “is, in fact, an alien.”28 Further, the case found that the
establishment of probable cause in the immigration context is the same as it is in a criminal context. This

Id. at 1269.
See Gonzalez, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1016–21
28
Id. at 817, quoting Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2018)
26
27
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means that the government must rely on a “reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a
prudent person in believing that an individual has committed an offense.”29
The decision in Gonzalez v. ICE challenges various U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
detainer practices, including the agency’s reliance on unreliable databases to generate detainers for local
law enforcement to hold individuals for transfer into immigration custody. The detainers generated by these
databases were the foundation of an immigration enforcement program called Secure Communities.
Secure Communities was a deportation program designed by DHS that relied on extensive
collaboration among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. According to ICE, 363,400 people
were removed under this program before being discontinued by President Biden in 2021.30 It relied
significantly on detainers issued solely on the basis of such unreliable electronic databases. ICE officers
and contractors reviewed the results of automated database searches on every person that was put into police
custody anywhere in the country. ICE subjected over 2 million people to these unconstitutional arrests since
the inception of the program in 2008 based on nothing but these database results.31
Another tool of federal and state cooperation favored by ICE is the 278(g) program. The 278(g)
program, named after Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, became law as a part of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRAIRA”) .32 This program
establishes a formal Memoranda of Agreement which deputizes local law enforcement officers to perform
central functions of federal immigration officers.33

Id. at 819
Secure communities, ICE, https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Mar 14, 2022).
31
Press Release:Gonzalez v. ICE, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER (Sep. 30, 2021),
https://immigrantjustice.org/court_cases/gonzalez-v-ice (last visited Mar 14, 2022).
32
The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/287g-program-immigration (last visited Mar 14, 2022).
33
Id.
29
30
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Once deputized under 287(g), “law enforcement officers may issue immigration detainers,
interview individuals to ascertain immigration status, check DHS databases for information about
individuals they believe are not citizens, transfer immigrants directly to ICE custody, and even issue a
Notice to Appear (NTA), the charging document that begins the federal deportation process .”34 There are
currently only two types of 287(g) agreements that are employed in the field: the “jail enforcement” model
and the “warrant service officer” model. The jail enforcement model allows deputized officers to interrogate
suspected noncitizens who have been arrested on local charges regarding their immigration status and they
may place immigration detainers on those that they suspect to be subject to removal.
Under the model of warrant service officer (WSO), ICE trains, certifies, and authorizes selected
state and local law enforcement officers to execute ICE administrative warrants.35 These officers are then
permitted to perform the arrest functions of an immigration officer within their jails and/or correctional
facilities.36 This model differs from the jail enforcement model in that the local law enforcement officers
are not authorized to interrogate alleged noncitizens about their immigration status.37
Federal, state, and local governments also have Inter-Governmental Service Agreements (IGSAs),
which are contracts where local agencies agree to provide space in their county jails or state prisons to
detain people during their immigration removal proceedings.38 The federal government typically pays these
facilities for each person that the jail or prison detains for ICE, so it provides a financial incentive to
incarcerate more immigrants.39 The existence of IGSAs disproportionally increases ICE’s surveillance and

34

Nayna Gupta & Heidi Altman, Policy Brief: Disentangling Local Law Enforcement from Federal Immigration
Enforcement , NATIONAL IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CENTER (Jan 13, 2021), https://immigrantjustice.org/researchitems/policy-brief-disentangling-local-law-enforcement-federal-immigration-enforcement (last visited Mar 14,
2022).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Joshua Breisblatt & Alyson Sincavage, Assumption of Risk: Legal Liabilities for Local Governments That Choose
to Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER (Mar 7, 2018),
https://immigrantjustice.org/research-items/report-assumption-risk-legal-liabilities-local-governments-chooseenforce-federal (last visited Mar 14, 2022).
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detention capacity.40 Some jurisdictions participate in both a 287(g) program and an IGSA, creating
perverse financial incentives for local police officers to execute detainers under their 287(g) authority in
order to fill up their jails, which increases the likelihood of racial profiling in local arrest practices.41
Relying on local law enforcement officers to interpret complex federal immigration laws to make
decisions, such as whether to issue an immigration detainer, exposes local law enforcement officers to
significant liability.
Gang Databases and their Disprortionate Impact on Immigrants:
Local, state, and federal gang databases identify certain people as gang members, often without
much reason, and may include photos and other information.42 Anyone identified as a gang member or an
“associate” may experience dramatic consequences to their immigration status.43 Some gang-related
databases that are used by immigration agencies and other law enforcement agencies in the U.S. include
GangNET, ICEGangs, and the NCIC Gang File, as well as gang databases maintained independently by
different state and local agencies.44
GangNET is a commercial intranet-linked software that appears to be critical for the collection and
storage of gang related information by state and federal governments.45 The program offers a database filled
with information on individuals and gangs along with photo, data analysis, mapping, facial recognition
software, a watch list, and a field interview form.46 Agencies can use a single command to simultaneously
search their own GangNET system as well as a network of GangNET systems in other states and federal

40

Id.
Id.
42
SEAN GRACIA-LEYS ET AL., MISLABED: ALLEGATIONS OF GANG MEMBERSHIP AND THEIR
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES (2016), https://www.law.uci.edu/academics/real-life-learning/clinics/ucilawirc-MislabeledReport.pdf.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Privacy Impact Assessment for the GangNet, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (May 31, 2006),
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/page/file/912976/download (last visited Mar 14, 2022).
46
Id.
41
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agencies.47 The GangNET software is operational in many states such as Arizona, California, District of
Columbia, and ten other states, as well as Canada.48 Of those, some were sharing information in real time.49
The system allows data collection from various law enforcement personnel, such as officers in the field,
patrol officers, gang units, corrections officers, and other law enforcement entities.50
In 2010, ICE created its own gang database called ICEGangs, to function as a repository of personal
information on suspected or confirmed gang members and their “associates,” as well as for information on
gang activities.51 The ICEGangs system was based on GangNET’s software and “tailored to include
immigration status–related information.”52 Agents of ICE could use ICEGangs to gain access to other
databases that use GangNET.53 The Immigrant Legal Resource Center reported on April of 2017 that ICE
has stopped using ICEGangs in 2016 because ICE agents were instead relying on other case management
databases.54 ICE has not confirmed that it no longer uses ICEGangs and has not issued any insight into how
and when it collects and uses information pertaining to suspected gang membership.55
The Gang File in the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database provides
information to both state and local law enforcement, but also to ICE as well.56 The criteria under which
information about a person would be inserted into the Gang File (formerly the Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organizations File, or VGTOF) include that the person in question has admitted to being a gang member,

Id.
Id.
49
See: White Paper: GangNet® Software, SRA International,
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1683801/gangnet8-whitepaper2013.pdf (last visited Mar 14, 2020).
50
Id., p.2
51
Privacy Impact Assessment for the ICEGangs Database, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Jan 15,
2010), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_16_ice_icegangs.pdf.
52
Id.
53
Sean Garcia-Leys, et. al., supra note 42, p. 8.
54
Practice Advisory: Understanding Allegations Of Gang Membership/Affiliation In Immigration Cases, the
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER (Apr 2017),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/ilrc_gang_advisory-20170509.pdf (last visited Mar 14, 2020).
55
Privacy Impact Assessment for the ICEGangs Database, supra note 51.
56
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) (Federal Bureau of Investigation),
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic. (last visited Mar 14, 2020).
47
48
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that informants have identified this person as a gang member, or that this person has spent time in a
proximity of a gang, or in their “area.”57 State and local law enforcement officers can enter names into the
Gang File, and often their submissions are not subject to any restrictions or checks for accuracy.58
The existence and use of the databases described above can be difficult to challenge because they
were created, ostensibly, to combat crime and gang violence. However, as noted above, these databases are
subject to few rules and little accountability. Historically, people who are listed in gang databases have had
little control over their accuracy and few options to contest their inclusion in them.59 Moreover, according
to a report conducted by the National Immigration Law Center, gang databases have been shown to contain
listings for people who quite clearly and unequivocally should not have been listed, citing cases for infants
as an example.60
Whether someone is included in a gang database system is often left at the discretion of local law
enforcement, and the police’s reliance on racial stereotypes can lead to a disproportionate amount of people
of color being included in the databases.61 As the databases are so inextricably linked, when an erroneous
information is entered into one database, it can easily infect others with inaccuracies because of their
information-sharing practices.

“Privacy Act of 1974; Notice of Modified Systems of Records,” 64 Fed . Reg. 52343–52349 (Sep. 28, 1999),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1999-09-28/pdf/99-24989.pdf.
58
James Jacobs and Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, N.Y.U.
JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, (Winter 2008) p. 193.
59
Untangling The Immigration Enforcement Web, THE NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER (Sep, 2017)
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Untangling-Immigration-Enforcement-Web-2017-09.pdf (last
visited Mar 14, 2022)
60
Id.
61
Rebecca A. Hufstader, Immigration Reliance on Gang Databases: Unchecked Discretion and Undesirable
Consequences, 90 NYU. L. REV. 671 (2015).
57
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In August 2016, the California State Auditor prepared a report about CalGang, California’s version
of GangNET, and exposed serious problems.62 The report explains that CalGang plays an important role in
populating federal gang databases, and its data is shared with other states.63 However, the report states that
the system operates without any oversight, contains unsubstantiated and incorrect information, and does
little to actually protect public safety.64 In 2019, a review by Chicago’s Office of Inspector General found
similar systemic issues in their version.65
In Diaz Ortiz v. Garland, 23 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2022), a noncitizen teenager, native to El Salvador
filed a petition to review a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration
judge’s denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that federal
immigration officers should not have relied on the Boston Police Department’s gang database to determine
that the teenager was a member of the gang, MS-13, and therefore deemed deportable upon that. The court
observed that the way the information was entered into the databases was arbitrary and may be somewhat
racially motivated:
There is a patent disconnect between Diaz Ortiz's conduct as described in the database and
any threatening, “gang-like” activities. None of the reports support an inference that he had
participated in criminal activity at all, let alone the kinds of violent crimes for which MS13 is infamous. Indeed, absent the unsubstantiated statements that those with whom he
associated were gang members, the FIOs show no more than a teenager engaged in
quintessential teenage behavior -- hanging out with friends and classmates. These social
encounters occurred in unremarkable neighborhood locations for this peer group: at a park,
at school, in front of one teenager's home, on the benches in an empty stadium. The record
lacks any evidence as to why assigning points for those interactions was a reliable means

62

The CalGang Criminal Intelligence System: As the Result of Its Weak Oversight Structure, It Contains
Questionable Information That May Violate Individuals’ Privacy Rights (California State Auditor, Report 2015-130,
Aug. 2016), https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2015- 130.pdf.
63
Id., at p. 2.
64
Id., at p. 3.
65
Review of The Chicago Police Department’s “Gang Database”, CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL (Apr, 2019) https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/OIG-CPD-Gang-Database-Review.pdf
(last visited Mar 14, 2022)
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of determining gang membership. Certainly, the fact that the young men were all Hispanic
does not permit an inference that any, or all, of them were gang members.66
The court ordered a reconsideration of his asylum petition, citing “[f]laws in that database, including its
reliance on an erratic point system built on unsubstantiated inferences.” The court’s ruling basically states
that law enforcement agencies violate federal regulations when they gather “criminal intelligence”
information without reasonable suspicion that a person is actually involved in any criminal conduct.
Thomas Nolan, a professor at Emmanuel College and former Boston police officer, testified on
behalf of Diaz Ortiz as an expert.67 Nolan advocated that Diaz Ortiz “should not have been listed as a
verified gang member” because the “intelligence” about Diaz Ortiz did not comply with federal regulations
governing shared criminal intelligence databases in the Code of Federal Regulations .68 Nolan explained
that the regulations are implicated since the Gang Assessment Database “is an interjurisdictional shared
database that [is] accessible to other agencies.”69 The part of the code to which Nolan referred was originally
adopted in 1980 to ensure that the operation of criminal intelligence systems was not conducted “in violation
of the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals.”70 The court in the instant case, commented that this
purpose that has remained unchanged.71
Following this opinion, it would logically flow that some of the criteria that are used to induct
someone into gang databases would violate federal regulations and also raise constitutional concerns. As
emphasized by the court, “[T]he federal regulations cited above plainly prohibit entities like BRIC from
collecting ‘criminal intelligence information’ about an individual unless ‘there is reasonable suspicion that
the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity.’ 28 C.F.R. § 23.20(a) (emphasis added). Simply

Diaz Ortiz v. Garland, 23 F.4th 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2022).
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68
See generally 28 C.F.R. Part 23.
69
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71
Diaz Ortiz v. Garland, supra note 66, citing 28 C.F.R. § 23.1.
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associating with people who may be engaged in criminal activity is not enough .”72 Thomas Nolan
subsequently commented to a reporter that “freedom of association is a constitutionally protected activity
under the First Amendment, and that’s lost” in the establishment of gang database procedures.73
The Boston Police Department amended its database policy, clarifying that Bostonians may not be
deemed gang members solely on the basis of a police officer’s casual observations at random interactions.74
It’s unclear how much error is eliminated by this update but, the recent decision from the First Circuit might
open up an avenue for further examination on the use and validity of such databases.
The Extent of ICE’s Authority:
In Morales v. Chadbourne, the Rhode Island state court ordered that a woman be released from a
local jail on personal recognizance while her criminal case was on going. 75 The jail continued to hold her
back on an ICE detainer for immigration purposes.76 The ICE detainer lacked any proper justification for
her immigration detention.77 Upon suing ICE, the court held that ICE lacked probable cause since it failed
to sufficiently investigate her immigration status before the issuance of the detainer.78 It was later
established that the woman was, in fact, a naturalized U.S. citizen.79 This case cemented that it is established
law that ICE agents first Frequire probable cause to issue an immigration detainer.80 The court noted, “It
remains undisputed that the State detained Ms. Morales based on an invalid detainer and that it did not

Id.
Hassan Kanu, D.C.'s gang database highlights unconstitutional systems nationwide, REUTERS (Jan 19, 2022)
https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/dcs-gang-database-highlights-unconstitutional-systems-nationwide2022-01-19/ (last visited Mar 15, 2022)
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Boston Polic Department, Boston Police Department Police Reform Policy Update, CITY OF BOSTON (Jun 10,
2021) https://www.boston.gov/news/boston-police-department-police-reform-policy-update (last visited Mar 15,
2022)
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afford her appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard on her further detention,19 both in violation of
Ms. Morales' constitutional rights.”81
Detainers issued by ICE are not judicial warrants, and local agencies are not required to respond to them.82
A detainer can be signed by any ICE officer based on ICE’s discretionary interest in deporting a person.83
Unlike in the case of police warrants, ICE officers do not have the practice of obtaining a prompt probable
cause determination from from a jude, prior to making an arrest.84
In 2020, Los Angeles County settled for $14 million in a class-action lawsuit against the L.A.
County Sheriff Department for its practice of routinely holding people in jail beyond their release dates due
to detainer requests from ICE. This settlement underscores the significant liability local law enforcement
agencies face in cooperating with federal immigration agencies.85
In 2019, a federal district court judge issued a permanent injunction in Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F.
Supp. 3d 995 (C.D. Cal. 2019), which blocked ICE from issuing detainers based solely on information
acquired from database searches, because the court found that such searches are too unreliable. This
decision “blocked all detainers generated by one ICE station in Laguna Niguel, California, from which ICE
issues detainers 24 hours per day within California and afterhours for 47 other states.”86 Recently, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed and upheld part of the district court’s decision, finding that ICE’s current
use of detainers still fails to meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirements.87
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Border Searches of Electronic Devices:
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether the Fourth Amendment’s border search exception
extends to warrantless searches of personal electronic devices, such as cell phones and computers. These
devices typically contain more personal and sensitive information than is typically found in a backpack or
inside an automobile. However, some lower courts have addressed the constitutionality of such searches in
a few notable cases.
In the 2014 decision Riley v. California, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
warrantless electronic device searches within the borders of the United States.88 The Court held that the
police are not allowed to conduct a warrantless search of a cell phone seized during an arrest . The Court
held this despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement usually does not apply to
searches incident to a lawful arrest.89 The Court noted that this exception applies to brief physical searches
of property that are within the immediate control of the arrestee in order to prevent potential harm to the
police officers and the destruction of evidence. The Court determined that “[t]here are no comparable risks
when the search is of digital data.”90
The Riley Court also surmised that searching cell phone data raised greater issues of privacy than
searching physical items that are typically found on a person, such as a wallet.91 The Court observed that
unlike most physical items that one might have on their person, cell phones carry “immense storage
capacity” and a broader range of private information, including photographs, text messages, contact
information, videos, financial records, and internet browsing history.92 As such, “[c]ell phones differ in

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378, 385 (2014)
Id. at 401 (“[A] warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to
arrest.”).
90
Id. at 386.
91
Id. at 393.
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Id. at 393–94.
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both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”93
The Court held that the police must first secure a warrant before they can search the contents of a cell phone
seized during an arrest,94 but also noted that “other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless
search of a particular phone.”95 The Court suggested that there remained a continued availability of
exception warranted in exigent circumstances to pursue a fleeing suspect, prevent the imminent destruction
of evidence, or to assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury .96 The
Court, however, did not address whether the border search exception allows warrantless electronic device
searches at the border as an exigent circumstance.
Lower courts have applied the border search exception to electronic device searches. For instance,
in United States v. Ickes, the Fourth Circuit court held that manually inspecting the contents of a computer
at the border was permissible provided “the Supreme Court’s insistence that U.S. officials be given broad
authority to conduct border searches.”97 The court concluded that “[t]his well-recognized exception to the
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment comes with an equally well-established rationale.”98
The Ninth Circuit court ruled that the search of a computer also fell within the border search
exception in United States v. Arnold, because examining a computer’s files is analogous to scanning the
contents of luggage.99 The court also highlighted the balance of national interest against individual rights,
quoting: “It is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a
paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity.”100 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit also found that

Id. at 393.
Id. at 403.
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Id. at 401-402.
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while a “quick look” at files in a computer would not warrant a strong suspicion, a forensic examination101
of the hard drive exceeded the scope of a routine border search given its “comprehensive and intrusive
nature.”102 The court clarified that “[e]lectronic devices often retain sensitive and confidential information
far beyond the perceived point of erasure, notably in the form of browsing histories and records of deleted
files,”103 and that, “[s]uch a thorough and detailed search of the most intimate details of one’s life is a
substantial intrusion upon personal privacy and dignity.”104 The court held that a “computer strip search”
such as in the aforementioned circumstances required reasonable suspicion.105
In 2018, the Fourth Circuit ruled that forensic border analysis of a cellphone required “some form
of individualized suspicion” provided the scope of exposure of “uniquely sensitive information” within the
device.106 Citing Riley, the court in United States v. Kolsuz reasoned that cell phones are “fundamentally
different” from other personal objects traditionally subject to government searches, such as wallets and
purses.107 Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment requires no suspicion of
criminal activity to warrant a forensic border searches of electronic devices in United States v. Touset.108
The court noted that the Supreme Court has previously upheld an unwarranted search of a fuel tank at the
border without imposing any heightened requirements for other types of personal property.109 The court
reasoned that even though the Supreme Court has imposed requirements of reasonable suspicion for
searches that can be qualified to be highly intrusive (i.e., of a person’s body), the Court has yet to extend
this requirement to border searches of personal property, “however nonroutine and intrusive.”110 The court
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A forensic examination of an electronic device includes using a software to copy the hard drive and analyze its
contents, including deleted content.
102
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2013).
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further reasoned that the restrictions imposed on warrantless cell phone searches incident to an arrest in
Riley111 did not apply to searches at the border, where expectations of privacy are diminished.112
Courts have also disagreed about what the proper scope of an electronic device search is at the
border. The Ninth Circuit has held that the search of an electronic device must be limited to a search for
digital contraband within the device itself, and does not include searching the device for additional evidence
that may lead to the discovery of a crime in saying, “border officials are limited to searching for contraband
only; they may not search in a manner untethered to the search for contraband.” 113 The court distinguished
the searches concerning items that are actually being smuggled from searches of evidence that may
eventually lead to the discovery of contraband.114 The court therefore determined that border officials may
conduct searches of a cellphone under reasonable suspicion that the cellphone physically contains
contraband.115
In United States v. Aigbekaen, the Fourth Circuit court ruled that Customs and Border Patrol
(“CBP”) officials may conduct forensic border searches of electronic devices so long as there is a reasonable
suspicion that the electronic device contains evidence of a crime that “bears some nexus” to the exigent
justifications for the border search exception.116 Similarly, the First Circuit has held that “advanced border
searches of electronic devices may be used to search for contraband, evidence of contraband, or for evidence
of activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or ICE.” 117
In summation, lower courts have generally offered CBP officers the latitude to conduct relatively
limited searches of electronic devices at the border without requiring a warrant or any particularized
suspicion. However, courts have disagreed about whether more intrusive searches require at the very least
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a reasonable suspicion of a crime, and whether such reasonable suspicion must be specifically tied to
evidence of the contraband found within the device itself, or if the suspicious may be used to gather any
evidence of potential criminal activity that may be taking place.

Biometric Data Collection at the Border:
Biometric data is often collected from international travelers.118 The term biometric data refers to
unique identifiers of a person—such as their DNA, fingerprints, voice recordings, iris or retinal scans,
walking gait, and facial geometry.119 There are several federal statutes that address the collection and use
of biometric data by the government, most of which involve screening international travelers who are
arriving or departing and other border security measures.120 8 U.S.C. § 1365b requires that DHS establish
an integrated and automated biometric entry-exit system which can record the arrival and departure of
foreign nationals, collect biometric data to verify their identity, and authenticate travel documents through
the comparison of biometrics.121
6 U.S.C. § 1118, requires that the CBP and the Transportation Security Administration consult
each other on the deployment of biometric technologies. It further requires that DHS assess the impacts of
using biometric technology and submit an assessment report to Congress.122 The Office of Biometric
Identity Management (“OBIM”) routinely maintains a database called the Automated Biometric
Identification System (“IDENT”), which holds more than 260 million unique identifiers.123 This
information can be used for a variety of purposes, including “to detect and prevent illegal entry into the
United States,” facilitate travel, and verify visa applications.124

118

Carra Pope, Biometric Data Collection in an Unprotected World: Exploring the Need for Federal Legislation
Protecting Biometric Data, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 769, 773–74 (2018)
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1379
121
Id. § 1365b.
122
6 U.S.C. § 1118(c).
123
Biometrics, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics (last visited Feb. 24, 2022)
124
Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

21

The University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 3

Of course, this practice of collecting biometric information raises privacy concerns.125 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly stressed that the border yields a lower expectation of privacy and that the “[t]he Fourth
Amendment balance between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is
struck much more favorably to the Government ”126 The Second Circuit has indicated that collecting
fingerprints, a type of biometric identifier, at a land port of entry was part of a routine search and no
reasonable suspicion was required for justification.127 In Davis v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that
the collection of fingerprints did not raise Fourth Amendment concerns when conducted within the United
States.128 The Court upheld the police’s practice of collecting the fingerprints of lawfully arrested persons,
describing it to be minimally intrusive as it “involves none of the probing into an individual’s private life
and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.”129
Additionally, the Supreme Court has also indicated that persons generally do not have a Fourth
Amendment interest in “physical characteristics ... constantly exposed to the public,” such as their facial
features or tone of voice.130 The Supreme Court in United States v. Dionisio held that a directive given to a
grand jury for a witness to give a voice exemplar was not an infringement of the witness’s Fourth
Amendment rights. The Court opined,
In Katz . . . we said that the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office. . . . The physical
characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as opposed to the content of a
specific conversation, are constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's facial
characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No
person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice,
any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world. 131
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As such, the practice of collecting biometric information such as facial geometry or walking gait will likely
not raise constitutional concerns. In conclusion, current jurisprudence suggests that the current practice of
biometric data collection such as the collection and comparison of facial geometry may be considered to be
only minimally intrusive at the border and therefore will not likely implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Facial Recognition Software and Privacy:
ICE uses facial recognition to obtain personal information from DMV databases.132 This can be a
home address, license plate number, or more intimate details, like place of birth or whether a foreign
passport was used to prove identity.133 ICE can use this information to decide whom to target for
immigration enforcement and to locate the people it has targeted.134 It can also use DMV databases,
primarily the driver license database, to locate specific individuals.135 According to the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, ICE agents consider the data in DMV records, among others, to be more current and
reliable than the DHS address database.136 The problem with the practice of using facial recognition
software to mine the data in DMV databases is that it lacks a governing authority. ICE has admitted that no
federal policy governs ICE’s ability to access or use DMV data.137
Neither Congress nor state legislatures have authorized the development of such a system .138 For
the time being, no one has given ICE explicit authority to mine DMV databases for data, but no one is
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prohibiting ICE from doing this either.139 As facial recognition usage develops rapidly, there are very few
guidelines in place relating to privacy protections.
Tech giant Amazon is now involved in helping to locate and track undocumented immigrants.140
Amazon’s Ring Doorbell is a video doorbell which allows users to see people who come to the door in real

time while also recording visitors.141 The data is subsequently stored on Amazon's cloud.142 The Ring app
is also currently partnered with more than 400 police departments across America.143 Audrey Knutson
profers concerns that may come up surrounding the rise of such facial recognition software especially for
undocumented immigrants:
These partnerships streamline how Ring video data can be accessed by police, even without
warrants. Currently, Ring does not use facial recognition software, but it did file a patent
in December 2018 to pair the two technologies. The application describes a system that the
police can use to match the faces of people walking by a doorbell camera with a photo
database. If a match occurs, the person's face can be automatically sent to law enforcement,
and the police are able to arrive in minutes. It is not a far leap to assume ICE can also
access Ring video data with Ring facial recognition software or their own. Furthermore,
Amazon has pitched another facial recognition tool, Rekognition, to law enforcement
agencies, including ICE, to target and identify undocumented immigrants. Rekognition has
the ability to identify people from afar, a type of technology that immigration officials have
voiced interest in for its potential enforcement use on the southern border. Amazon
developed Rekognition as a way to analyze images and detect faces on a massive scale.144

Facial Recognition and Pushback:
Clearview AI, a facial recognition company based in America, provides software to companies,
law enforcement, universities, and individuals.145 The company’s algorithm can match faces to a database
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of more than three billion images indexed from the internet, including social media sites.146 Clearview has
been sued by two immigrant rights groups in California for allegedly violating privacy laws .147 One of the
complaints filed in Alameda county states that, “Clearview has provided thousands of governments,
government agencies and private entities access to its database, which they can use to identify people with
dissident views, monitor their associations, and track their speech.”148

The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has also launched a case against Clearview in Cook
County Court in Chicago.149 The court has denied Clearview’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of First
Amendment claims.150 The court noted that:
The central conflict in this case is the clash between privacy rights and First Amendment
protections in an age of ever-more-powerful technology. Defendant Clearview AI, Inc.
("Clearview") used facial recognition technology to capture more than three billion
faceprints from publicly available photos on the internet. A faceprint is a biometric
identifier used to verify a person's identity. To create a faceprint, Clearview's system scans
the photo, measures, and records data such as the shape of the cheekbones and the distance
between eyes, nose, and ears, and assigns that data a numerical value. These faceprints are
then collected into a database, with faceprints for similar-looking faces clustered together.
Clearview sells access to its technology, database, and investigative tools-the "world's best
facial-recognition technology combined with the world's largest database of headshots"-by
subscription to public and private entities. When a user wants to identify someone, the user
uploads a photo. The system then processes the request, finds matches, and returns links to
publicly available images on the internet. Often, the linked websites will include additional
information about the person identified. The facts recited here are derived from Plaintiffs'
Complaint and its exhibits and are accepted as true for purposes of Defendant's motion to
dismiss.151
The court further held that Clearview’s practice of face printing is not entitled to “strict scrutiny” of the
speech restraint, which is the highest level of First Amendment protection, but instead should be determined
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under “intermediate scrutiny.”152 This is appropriate because Clearview’s actions do not address a matter
of public concern, but rather solely serve Clearview in commercial purposes.
In 2008, Illinois passed the Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA"), a law protecting the
“biometric identifiers and biometric information” of its residents.153 Two other states, Texas and
Washington, followed suit and passed their own biometric privacy laws.154 The Illinois law strictly forbids
private entities from collecting, capturing, purchasing or otherwise obtaining a person's biometrics,
including a scan of their “face geometry,” without that person's consent.155 Violating the BIPA can
essentially provide a cause of tort action, and individuals can then sue for damages when such violations
occur.156
After applying intermediate scrutiny, the court upheld the application of BIPA’s opt-in consent
requirement to Clearview’s face printing.157 The court then emphasized Illinois’ important interests in
protecting the “privacy and security” of the public from biometric surveillance by third parties, including
the “difficulty in providing meaningful recourse once a person’s [biometrics] have been compromised .”158
The court further explained that the opt-in consent requirement is “no greater than necessary” to advance
this interest because it “returns control over citizens’ biometrics to the individual whose identity could be
compromised.”159 In response to Clearview’s argument that accommodating BIPA hurts its business model,
the court said, “[t]hat is a function of having forged ahead and blindly created billions of faceprints without
regard to the legality of that process in all states.”160
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The current litigation surrounding privacy rights of immigrants are raising the right questions when
it comes to addressing immigrants’ rights. Legislations like BIPA would require being substantially fleshed
out to protect undocumented immigrants. One possible solution for facial recognition search for immigrants
and citizens alike is to create automatic property-like rights to their likeness as offered by Audrey
Knutsmen.161 However, as the paper explains, this solution will face substantial difficulty in regards to its
implementation:
The problem with creating property-like rights for face templates is American law does not
recognize these “rights of self.” Americans do not actually own their names, social security
numbers, or identities and courts have struggled giving property rights to body parts like
sperm cells, spleen cells, corneas, etc.” Similarly, no one actually owns their fingerprints.
However, a face template is not as tangible as body parts and can exist entirely within the
digital realm. And unlike fingerprints or body parts, there is a higher probability of abuse
of face templates-as evidenced above, racial discrimination in investigations can occur
from face template evidence alone. When an investigation yield fingerprints or even DNA,
it is not proceeding through discriminatory avenues but rather reliable scientific paths.
Facial recognition is too inaccurate to be relied upon and the threat of discrimination is too
high. Add in the constitutional concerns of undocumented immigrants, and the necessity
to create present possessory interests in face templates becomes of great importance.162
Knutsmen further suggests that the U.S. look to European law for guidance on granting moral rights to a
person’s face template.163 Though these suggestions are insightful, it is most likely that the expansion of
rights of undocumented immigrants will come through litigation, being driven by advocates and interest
groups.

Conclusion:
In the face of exponential advances in technology, American courts have yet to balance the privacy
rights of undocumented immigrants with the interest of immigration enforcement. Constitutional violations
continue to deprive immigrants of liberty and property, resulting in family separations, heartache, and racial
stereotyping at and within the border. Congress has the ultimate Constitutional power to regulate
immigration, but it also has a a Constitutional duty to protect the substantive rights of all individuals,
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including those undergoing immigration proceedings. The privacy rights of immigrants have eroded and
continue to erode. When the ACLU sued the FBI and the Department of Justice over their use of facial
recognition software, Kade Crockford, the director of the Technology for Liberty Program at the ACLU of
Massachusetts told CNN, “Technology has outpaced our civil rights.”164 The federal government is
continuously expanding the limits with surveillance and privacy invasion, especially at the Mexican
border.165 The framers could have never known the kind of concerns that technology has put upon the rights
of people in the United States.
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